rtyler

It's no secret where GitOps falls down

This year I have started to see a new buzzword get thrown around, one which I can feel especially hipstery about: GitOps. While the folks over at WeaveWorks have made the term fashionable in the Kubernetes ecosystem, stodgy old-timer Puppet users might recognize the same practices they’ve used for a few years now by combining R10k and Git. In fact, I was first introduced to the concept by Gary Larizza, an absolutely loud, foul-mouthed, and wonderful hacker. The concepts Gary blogged about I rapidly introduced to the Jenkins project’s own Puppet-based infrastructure. This blog post isn’t about how sunglasses-at-night cool all us Puppet users have been, but instead I wished to clarify some areas where “GitOps” as a practice falls short, and what is needed to compensate.

GitOps, in essence, is using Git as the source of truth to drive infrastructure changes through environments using pull request and branches. Many organizations dress it up with additional trappings which may benefit their particular needs, but fundamentally it boils down to: infrastructure as code, using Git for environment/pipeline management.

For example, with the Jenkins project’s Puppet-based infrastructure, we follow the following branching model sand workflow:

+----------------+
| pull-request-1 |
+-----------x----+
             \
              \ (review and merge, runs acceptance tests)
staging        \
|---------------o--x--x--x---------------->
                          \
                           \ (manual merge, auto-deploys to prod hosts)
production                  \
|----------------------------o------------->

This same model works rather well for Kubernetes resources where one might progress an application deployment through a series of stages before reaching production.

In addition to the hopefully obvious benefits of infrastructure as code, this approach couples nicely with ephemeral environments, and strong automated test practices which allow developers to validate their infrastructure changes in pull requests before reaching production, which is only a merge away!

It is not all rainbows and :tada: emojis. “What they don’t tell you” is how to manage secrets effectively.


Consider a simple web application, “Hiya!”, wherein a user enters an email into a form field, clicks a button, and receives a “Hello World!” email in their inbox. “Hiya!” is effectively stateless, but requires a SendGrid API token in order to send the user an email. Naturally for our “staging” environment, the application should using a SendGrid staging API token and URL, whereas for the “production” environment it should be using a different token backed by a very big credit card for our high-scale email sending application.

For most organizations, it would be reasonable for all the devs to have access to the SendGrid staging API token for testing their applications, so that can probably be checked into the hiya.git repository.

What about production credentials?

A couple options come to mind:

  1. Check those credentials into hiya.git in an encrypted form, which the Jenkins Pipeline can properly decrypt and deploy into the Kubernetes, or other, production environment.
  2. Use a separate “shadow” development and delivery flow strictly for secrets and credentials. This delivery pipeline would only be visible to a select few, typically operations staff.
  3. Connect some external secrets management tool (Vault, Amazon Key Management Service, Azure Key Value)to remove any kind of “GitOps” development workflow for secrets.

Thus far, I have not found a consistently useful approach for managing secrets across GitOps workflows between conventional and Kubernetes-based infrastructure.

For the Jenkins project’s infrastructure, we rely on a hybrid approach: encrypting credentials and managing them in a somewhat separate “shadow” delivery pipeline using Puppet and hiera (with hiera-eyaml).

The trade-off with the approaches 2 & 3 above, and the hybrid model the Jenkins project utilizes is that “ops” has to be informed and involved with changes going to production. Our involvement is typically only to make sure that a “shadow” pull request is being developed with the production credentials alongside the actual application deployment code. More than once I’ve inadvertently deployed an application to production, only later to realize that that application was using staging credentials because a shadow pull request hadn’t yet been merged.

Using the example flow from above as a reference, our combined workflow might look something like this:

+----------------------------------+
| pull-request-1 (requires secret) |
+--------------------------x-------+
                            \
                             \ (review and merge, runs acceptance tests)
               staging        \
               |---------------o--x--x--x---------------->
                                         \
                                          \ (manual merge, auto-deploys to prod hosts)
               production                  \
               |----------------------------o---O--------->
                                               /
                                              /
                            ------------------
                            production deploy
                            -----------------
secrets repository                  |
|-----------------o-----------------O--------------------->
                 / (merge ahead of pr#1)
                /
   +-----------x---------------------+
   | pull request for secret in pr#1 |
   +---------------------------------+

Not ideal. But unfortunately I have not found a better approach for managing secrets with the “GitOps” development flow. That said, having two Git-based flows is a reasonable middle ground, but typically cross-repository traffic-policing challenges do apply


I’m very interested to learn about how other folks are solving the problem of managing secrets with a Git-based infrastructure deployment flow. Whether we’re talking about secrets and certificates being delivered by a tool like Puppet, or something uploading secrets into different namespaces in Kubernetes.

Some other challenges with Git-based infrastructure delivery approaches (GITOPS!!1), particularly with Kubernetes, which I find interesting:

  • Enforcing compliance with security standards.
  • Preventing configuration/state drift, which is where Puppet excels.
  • Blending pipelines from multiple repositories, such that different applications could reasonably maintain their own configurations, without needing to run fully separate deployment pipelines.

While these challenges exist, I still fundamentally agree that “GitOps” should be the preferred approach for auditability and tracking of state as infrastructure and application code moves towards production.

It’s not all rainbows and :tada: emojis, but I think we’re getting there.