Passing credentials to Otto steps

One of the major problems I want to solve with Otto is that in many CI/CD tools secrets and credentials can be inadvertently leaked. Finding a way to allow for the secure use of credentials without giving developers direct access to the secrets is something most CI/CD systems fail at today. My hope is that Otto will succeed because this is a problem being considered from the beginning. In this post, I’m going to share some of the thoughts I currently have on how Otto can pass credentials around while removing or minimizing the possibility for them to be leaked by user code.

In the course of my career I have spent a lot of time on this problem already. In the Jenkins project we have had to deal with a number of “credential integrity” problems where plugins, or more frequently users’ pipelines end up leaking credentials. I have some thoughts about this problem with Jenkins written down already in these posts:

Ultimately, the key challenge is drawing the boundary between “arbitrary user-defined code” and credentials. Consider an open source project which accepts pull requests and uses their CI system to validate proposed changes. In this contrived example, pretend that the CI scripting for the project will:

  • Build the package
  • Run the tests
  • Push a snapshot binary somewhere for any manual testing that may be desired.

Presumably only the last step requires any type of credential. For demonstration, I will use Jenkins Pipeline but the problem is present in many other systems:

sh 'make package'
sh 'make tests'
withCredentials([string(credentialsId: 'mytoken', variable: 'TOKEN')]) {
    sh 'make deploy'
}

There are various mechanisms to prevent a pull request from modifying the Jenkinsfile (in this example), and also ways to prevent outputting the mytoken credentials into the log stream. Ultimately however, since the credential is being exposed as an environment variable which is then being made available to user-defined code, in this case a Makefile. The only two ways to prevent a malicious pull request from using the token would be to:

  • Not run the make deploy script for pull requests
  • Only use the main branch version of the Makefile when running the pull request. (note: Jenkins basically does a variant of this by default with the Jenkinsfile)

My thinking right now is that Otto should never expose credentials as environment variables.

How this could work

In this blog post I alluded to the solution I am thinking about for Otto:

The simplest [pattern], the one which exposes those credentials to user-defined processes is fundamentally flawed. In Jenkins, an administrator can define credentials when configuring some plugins such as the Slack Notification plugin. In the case of Slack, the user cannot access the Slack credentials, but can invoke slackSend from within their Jenkins Pipeline. I strongly believe that variations on this pattern, wherein an administrator defines a credential and only allows administrator-governed code to utilize that credential, are the only ways in which credentials exposure can be avoided (barring bugs in the code, etc).

(added emphasis)

This is effectively exactly what I am thinking for Otto: credentials can never be accessed as environment variables or by user-defined steps. Instead they can be accessed from within the context of an administrator approved step library.

Otto’s notion of step libraries means that there is plenty of room for both administrator and user-defined code, but Otto should always know where a step comes from, and that coupled with a credential access pattern should provide sufficient safety.

Using the above example, imagine that make deploy is essentially just running:

curl -H "Token: $TOKEN" -X PUT -d @artifact-20201028-312.tar.gz https://example.com/api/archive

In Otto, that code would need to be wrapped in a step library of some form, for example a deploy-snapshot step.

The step below is a sketch in Ruby for ease of understanding:

#!/usr/bin/env ruby

require 'json'
require 'yaml'
# Imagine that this gem provides the agent control socket shim
require 'otto/control'

# Load the invocation file which defines where the control socket lives
invoke_data = YAML.load(File.read(ARGV.first))
control = invoke_data['configuration']['ipc']
artifact = invoke_data['parameters]['artifact']

# Send the HTTP request for the credential
response = Otto::Control::send(
                {:type => :RetrieveCredential,
                :name => 'mytoken'})

exit 1 unless response.ok?

# Grab the token to use
token = response['mytoken']['value']

# This could be done with Net::HTTP, but just for symmetry sake
# shell out to curl
system("curl -H 'Token: #{token}' -X PUT -d @#{artifact} https://example.com/api/archive")

The above would then be packaged as a deploy-snapshot-<version>.tar.gz and uploaded to the wherever Otto stores its step libraries (yet to be defined).

In order for this step to work properly, an administrator would need to explicitly state that the deploy-snapshot can access:

  • Credentials of specific names, e.g. mytoken.
  • All credentials.

In the above example, if mytoken was explicitly granted, any other credential retrieval requests would be denied and the step would error out since it did not receive the credential.

I can imagine somebody granting “all credentials” access to a standard library step such as sh. I believe in this case the credentials would still be safe so long as:

  • User-defined code cannot locate the agent control socket.
  • User-defined code cannot interact with the agent control socket. Right now there’s not an authentication scheme applied to the agent/step control socket, but it is trivial to add a pre-shared secret that is given to each step’s internal machinery to use for accessing the socket.

There may also be cases where an administrator is comfortable with allowing a user-defined step, such as one that is located in the local source tree or at a remote URL (e.g. on GitHub). For these cases, I think the initial behavior has to be a “deny and record the request.” The administrator should then be able to approve a user-defined step for credentials access at a specified revision such as deploy-snapshot@main or deploy-snapshot@1ff9033.

How this could not work

The reason environment variables are frequently used for passing secrets around is because it’s easy. Well, not only that. Developers are lazy. The forceful demarcation line between which code does and does not have credential access hasn’t been validated with lazy developers other than myself. I don’t yet know whether the bar I am setting is too high, or just high enough for real-world usage.

If the barrier to entry is too high, I can easily imagine somebody writing a withSecrets step which basically just takes whatever secrets you want and dumps them into environment variables. This would still require an administrator to approve the step, but the system would still allow the withSecrets step code to retrieve credentials and then handle them in any insecure manner they please.


I believe that the approach I describe above will prevent the easy and foolish cases where credentials get leaked. Ultimately, I don’t think Otto can 100% prevent credential leakage by somebody determined to shoot themselves in the foot.

If you’re a pipeline user or CI/CD systems administrator and have thoughts on how you would want to use or lock-down credentials, please join #otto on Freenode or email me with your thoughts!